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The Death Penalty and Reversible Error in Massachusetts
ALAN ROGERS*
For two hundred years, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
(SJC) held the power of life and death over capital defendants and appellants. From 1805 to 1996, the court heard more than 1200 defendants each
argue that during their homicide trial a serious procedural or substantive
mistake was made, an error which should cause the court to reverse their
guilty verdict.1 In fact, on average, the court found reversible error in one
out of every 6.25 appeals it heard.2 This incremental process, together with
the transformation of criminal due process initiated by Chief Justice Earl
Warren and the emergence of state constitutionalism, expanded the rights
of capital defendants and prompted the SJC to abolish capital punishment
in Massachusetts in 1980.3
From 1780 to 1891, the SJC had exclusive original jurisdiction of the
trial of capital cases. Prior to 1859, when it became possible to take exceptions to the ruling of the trial court, the only methods of review were by
motion for a new trial, motion in arrest of judgment, or writ of error.4 In
1891, original jurisdiction for homicide trials was shifted from the SJC to
the superior court.5 For the next forty-eight years, the SJC held the power
to reverse the guilty verdict of a trial court in a capital case only on a point
of law to which the defendant properly had taken exception. Only the
* Alan Rogers, Professor of History, Boston College; author of Murder and the Death Penalty in
Massachusetts (2008).
1. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 established the SJC and its published reports began in
1805. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 1, art. 29–30. From 1805 to 1996, 1217 homicide convictions were
appealed to the court. This number includes those cases heard by the court more than once. The foregoing, and all subsequent data in this article is compiled from the Massachusetts Reports vol. 1–423,
inclusive.
2. The SJC found reversible error in 190 cases.
3. For the SJC and state constitutionalism, see Charles H. Baron, The Supreme Judicial Court in its
Fourth Century: Meeting the Challenge of the “New Constitutional Revolution,” 77 MASS. L. REV. 35
(1992). In Commonwealth v. O’Neal (O’Neal I), 367 Mass. 440 (1975), the SJC abolished the death
penalty for rape-murder and in District Attorney for Suffolk District v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648 (1980),
the court found the death penalty unconstitutionally cruel under Art. 26 of the Declaration of Rights of
the Massachusetts Constitution.
4. In 1858, murder was classified in two degrees: the penalty for first degree murder was death; the
penalty for second degree murder was life imprisonment. Act of Mar. 27, 1858, ch. 154, §§ 1, 2, 1858
Mass. Acts 126, 126; MASS. GEN. STAT. ch. 160, §§ 1, 2 (1860).
5. 1891 Mass. Acts 966–68 transferred jurisdiction for capital cases to the superior court. See Act
of June 6, 1891, ch. 379, §1, 1891 Mass. Acts 966, 966 (transferring jurisdiction of capital trials to the
superior courts); Act of Oct. 17, 1859, ch. 282, §1, 1859 Mass. Acts 632, 632 (returning jurisdiction of
capital trials to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court).
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judge who heard the case had the right to grant a motion for a new trial
and, unless he was found to have abused his broad discretionary powers, it
was very unlikely his decision would be disturbed by the SJC. In the wake
of the bitterly divisive conviction and the executions of Sacco and Vanzetti
in 1927, the legislature increased the SJC’s powers to order a new trial “if
satisfied that the verdict was against the law or the weight of the evidence,
or because of newly discovered evidence, or for any other reason that justice may require.”6 In 1962, the legislature expanded the SJC’s power to
review capital cases by allowing it to consider the appellant’s degree of
guilt.7
This article will survey Massachusetts homicide cases from 1805 to
1996 in which the SJC found reversible error. For comparative purposes,
the data will be grouped into three periods: from 1805, the year the SJC
began to publish its decisions, to 1891, the year original jurisdiction for
homicide cases was transferred from the SJC to the Superior Court; 1892
to 1939, the year Massachusetts law allowed the SJC to review the facts as
well as the law of capital cases; and from 1940 to 1996, the year Chief
Justice Paul Liacos resigned from the court and the importance of state
constitutionalism declined. First, the data on reversible error will be situated within its proper legal-historical context and analyzed. Second, using
key cases, this article will illustrate some of the major changes in criminal
procedure initiated by the court’s finding of reversible error. I argue that
the sharp increase in the number of homicide cases in which the SJC found
reversible error and the resulting transformation of capital procedure was
stimulated chiefly by the SJC’s commitment to state constitutionalism after
Warren’s retirement in 1969. For these reasons, from 1970 to 1996 the
SJC reversed a greater percentage of capital cases than ever before in its
long history. Most importantly, in 1975 the court abolished the mandatory
death penalty for murder committed during a rape and in three subsequent
opinions found the death penalty violated Articles 12 and 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.8
6. 1939 Mass. Acts ch. 341 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 33E (1939)).
7. 1962 Mass. Acts ch. 453 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 33E (1962)).
8. The careers of two SJC chief justices have been probed in depth. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY,
THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957); G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF (1993); David J. Seipp, Chief Justice Holmes
on the Science and Art (and Politics) of Judging, 5 MASS. LEGAL HIST. 19 (1999) (especially pages 50–
53 on the execution of Luigi Storti). THE HISTORY OF THE LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS: THE SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURT 1692–1992 (Russell K. Osgood ed., 1992) provides valuable insights into the court’s
long history. Alan Rogers, Murder in Massachusetts: The Criminal Discovery Rule from Snelling to
Rule 14, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 438 (1996), Alan Rogers, “A Sacred Duty”: Court Appointed Attorneys in Massachusetts Capital Cases, 1780–1980, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 440 (1997), and Alan
Rogers, An Anchor to the Windward: The Right of the Accused to an Impartial Jury in Massachusetts
Capital Cases, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 35 (1999), focus on changes in Massachusetts criminal proce-

File: Rogers - 6 Pierce L. Rev. 3

2008

Created on: 3/5/2008 10:04:00 PM

Last Printed: 3/5/2008 10:05:00 PM

THE DEATH PENALTY AND REVERSIBLE ERROR

517

For more than 100 years, the SJC had exclusive jurisdiction over capital crimes. The chief justice and several associate justices presided over a
jury trial during which contested points of law were argued fully and immediately ruled on by the court. A post-conviction motion for a new trial
on an alleged error in point of law was possible, but such motions were of
“rare occurrence” and “if allowable at all,” Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw
stated in Commonwealth v. York,9 “on occasions of real difficulty and importance.”10 At the conclusion of that murder trial, Shaw allowed a motion
by defense attorney Richard Henry Dana, Jr. to be heard by the entire
court. Dana argued that Shaw had erroneously instructed the trial jury
when he said that given the circumstances surrounding Peter York’s late
night murder of a young Irishman, malice—the existence of which distinguishes murder from manslaughter—could be implied.11 For that reason,
the law, and not the jury, determined that York had committed murder.
The full court upheld Shaw’s trial court ruling and York was sentenced to
death.12
Long after the SJC ceased to be a trial court for capital cases, the cautious approach to the appeals process outlined by Shaw in York shaped the
SJC’s relationship with the trial courts and dramatically slowed the pace of
change in criminal procedure. Because the SJC ordinarily deferred to the
trial court’s ruling on the law, its review of a homicide case rarely yielded
a change in procedure or led to an expansion of the defendant’s rights. In
1937, for example, Harvard law Professors Sam Bass Warner and Henry B.
Cabot wrote convincingly about the legal procedure of an 1873 murder
case as if it were contemporary.13 Their point was to demonstrate how
little Massachusetts criminal procedure had changed in more than a half
century.14 As late as 1957, recently retired Chief Justice Stanley E. Qua
echoed the same sentiment when he told the Boston Bar Journal that he

dure. Although James M. Rosenthal’s organization of the data on reversible error is idiosyncratic, his
work is invaluable. See James M. Rosenthal, Reversible Error in Homicide Cases in Massachusetts,
MASS. L.Q., May 1928, at 106 (referencing cases from 1805–1927); James M. Rosenthal, Reversible
Error in Homicide Cases in Massachusetts, 1927–1949, MASS. L.Q., Oct. 1949, at 45. For the SJC’s
foray into state constitutionalism, see Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150 (1984); Watson,
381 Mass. 648; Opinion of the Justices, 372 Mass. 912 (1977); Commonwealth v. O’Neal (O’Neal II),
359 Mass. 242 (1975); O’Neal I, 367 Mass. 440; Henry Clay, Human Freedom and State Constitutional Law; Part One, The Renaissance, 70 MASS. L. REV. 161 (1985); Henry Clay, Human Freedom
and State Constitutional Law; Part Two, the Process, 71 MASS. L. REV. 12 (1986).
9. 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 93 (1845).
10. Id. at 100.
11. Id. at 96–97.
12. Id. at 125.
13. Sam B. Warner & Henry B. Cabot, Changes in the Administration of Criminal Justice During
the Past Fifty Years, 50 HARV. L. REV. 583, 584–85 (1937).
14. Id. at 585.
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favored “an old fashioned stand pat attitude,” adhering to established principles and deferring to the legislature if changes in the law were needed.15
The data on reversible error in homicide cases substantiates the characterization of the SJC as reluctant to promote change prior to 1970. From
1805 to 1891, the population of Massachusetts increased nearly five times,
from 400,000 people who lived chiefly in rural villages to about 2.5 million, eighty-six percent of whom lived in urban areas. During this period,
the court heard seventy-five homicide cases. Twenty-eight of those cases
were heard before the enactment of an 1858 law classifying murder into
two degrees. From 1858 to 1891, the court heard fourteen cases in which
the defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death and six cases in which the defendant was declared guilty of murder
in the second degree that carried a sentence of life. There were twenty-one
manslaughter convictions, the penalty for which varied from a fine up to
twenty years in prison. Three defendants were charged with being an accessory to a murder; the cases of three others involved the issue of insanity
and one defendant was found not guilty. The court found reversible error
in eight cases, or 10.65% of all homicide cases. One murder case was reversed along with seven manslaughter convictions. The percentage of reversals in all murder cases was 1.33%.16
Commonwealth v. Hardy17 was the first death sentence reversed by the
court. Although defense counsel had not objected to the procedure until
after the jury’s guilty verdict, the court determined that it had violated an
1805 statute that provided that all indictments of capital cases should be
heard before three or more justices of the SJC.18 A single justice had received William Hardy’s plea of not guilty of the murder of an infant; therefore, the full court reversed his death sentence and ordered a new trial.19
Chief Justice Theophilus Parsons, who throughout his tenure on the bench
encouraged close and logical arguments efficiently delivered, conceded: “If
even quibbling is at any time justifiable, certainly a man may quibble for
his life.”20 Hardy was acquitted at his second trial.21
The most important change in criminal procedure made by the court
during the period 1805–1891 was not brought to the court on a motion of
error. Rather, it was Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw’s instructions to the jury
15. Stanley E. Qua, A Few Reflections from the Experience of Twenty-Two Years, 1 BOSTON B.J. 9
(1957). Qua served on the SJC from 1934 to 1956, the last nine years as Chief Justice.
16. See HISTORICAL ATLAS OF MASSACHUSETTS 27, 35 (Richard W. Wilkie & Jack Tager eds.,
1991) (providing census data).
17. 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 303 (1807).
18. Id. at 314–16.
19. Id. at 317.
20. Id. at 316.
21. Id. at 317.
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on the criminal law of insanity that transformed the law. In Commonwealth v. Rogers,22 Shaw told the jury that it should apply a dual test. Giving “great weight” to expert opinion, Shaw stressed both the cognitive and
volitional elements.23 To be criminally responsible, a person must have
“capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish between right
and wrong as to the particular act he is then doing; a knowledge and consciousness that the act he is doing is wrong and criminal, and will subject
him to punishment.”24 But, Shaw added, even if a person knows the difference between right and wrong, his homicidal act may have been the
result of “an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse,” and “not the act of a
voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the body, without the concurrence of a mind directing it.”25
Shaw’s ruling formed the basis for the modern law of insanity in criminal cases, but neither the courts nor psychiatrists were entirely pleased
with the test. First, the rule often was difficult to apply because it failed to
encompass the mentally ill defendants who came before the court. Defendants who were mentally ill and pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity,
but who were said to be able to differentiate right from wrong and able to
resist sudden violent impulses ordinarily were declared sane by prosecution psychiatrists. Indeed, according to Massachusetts psychiatrist L. Vernon Briggs’s review of the pre-1920 court records, not a single defendant
declared sane by psychiatrists applying the Shaw test were able successfully to establish insanity in a Massachusetts court.26 In vain, psychiatrists
argued that the proper test for criminal responsibility should require a determination as to whether the crime was the “product of mental disease or
mental defect.”27 Second, testimony by psychiatrists often confused or
alienated jurors and the court. As late as 1926, Chief Justice Rugg articulated a common bias when he said that a trial judge could form a commonsense judgment about the defendant’s criminal responsibility that was better “than the refined distinctions and technical niceties of alienists and experts in psychopathic inferiority.”28

22. 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500 (1844).
23. Id. at 501–02, 505.
24. Id. at 501–02.
25. Id. at 502.
26. SAM BASS WARNER & HENRY B. CABOT, Judges and Law Reform, 4 HARV. L. SCH., SURVEY
OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN BOSTON 90 (1936). Briggs was the author of a 1922 law mandating neutral, state-administered psychiatric exams, Mass. Acts and Resolves, 1921, ch. 415.
27. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954); see also State v. Pike, 49
N.H. 399 (1870) (New Hampshire Chief Justice Charles Doe formulating the “product rule”). Although hailed as an advance, no other state court adopted Doe’s insanity test, but U.S. district court
Judge David Bazelon applied it in Durham. 214 F.2d at 876.
28. Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 257 Mass. 391, 395 (1926).
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Although a handful of murder cases in which the defendant pleaded
not guilty by reason of insanity commanded public attention in the century
following Shaw’s ruling in Rogers, the actual number of cases involving
insanity was a small percentage of the total number of murder indictments.
From 1844 to 1899, there were 578 indictments for murder, only fortyfour, or 7.6% of which involved the issue of insanity. Of the forty-four,
twenty-three persons were judged insane before trial and sent to an asylum.
At trial, twenty-one defendants pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity:
juries found seven of the twenty-one not guilty by reason of insanity and
the court committed the defendants to an asylum; three were found guilty
of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death; and eleven were found
guilty of murder in the second degree and sentenced to life imprisonment.29
During the period from 1900 to 1940—from the presidency of William
McKinley to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s election to a third term—there were
1253 indictments for murder in Massachusetts. Forty-nine defendants
(3.9%) raised the issue of insanity: thirty-four were determined to be insane before trial began and were committed by the court to an asylum;
twenty-five were found not guilty by reason of insanity. Quite in contrast
to the earlier period, where only one-third of defendants who pleaded not
guilty by reason of insanity were found not guilty, not a single defendant
who pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity before 1940 was found
guilty.30
Comparing the treatment of male defendants charged with murdering
their wives who raised the issue of insanity reveals an even more striking
difference between the nineteenth and early twentieth century. In the period 1844–1899, thirteen (29.5%) of the forty-four defendants who raised
the issue of insanity were men who were indicted for murdering their
wives. The thirteen cases were disposed of as follows: nine were sent by
the court to an asylum; one was found guilty of murder in the first degree
and sentenced to death; a jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the
second degree for one defendant who pleaded insanity; and two men who
pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity were found not guilty. By contrast, in the period 1900–1940, thirty-one (63.2%) of the forty-nine defendants who raised the issue of insanity were men indicted for murdering
their wives. Of the thirty-one, eighteen were determined to be insane before trial and were committed to an asylum and thirteen were found not
guilty by reason of insanity. In short, the defense of not guilty by reason of

29. This data is compiled from the ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Boston 1844–
1899).
30. Id. The attorney general ended the practice of compiling detailed annual homicide data in 1942.
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE YEAR ENDING 1942, at 6–7 (1943).
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insanity was a remarkably successful defense for a man charged with the
murder of his wife. Of course, the facts were different in each homicide
case in which the question of criminal responsibility played a part, but one
common thread cannot be ignored: an all male jury heard every one of
these cases.31
The SJC reversed three first-degree murder convictions and two manslaughter convictions during the period 1892–1939, in which the court
heard 108 homicide cases. Of that total, sixty-two had been found guilty
of first-degree murder, twenty-two of murder in the second degree, fifteen
were convicted of manslaughter, one was found not guilty by reason of
insanity; and three were found guilty on the charge of being an accessory
before the fact to murder in the first degree. In all homicide cases the percentage of reversals was 4.6%; in all murder cases, 4.6%.32
Each of the three capital murder defendants whose convictions were
reversed by the court was retried. The results were mixed. James Trefethen, a young Boston salesman convicted for the murder of Deltena
Davis, a twenty-six year old Charlestown shopkeeper, was one of the first
capital defendants to be tried in the superior court, instead of the SJC. On
appeal, the SJC ruled that it was erroneous to exclude the testimony of a
defense witness to whom the deceased had said, the day before her death,
that she intended to commit suicide if her lover did not agree to marriage.33
The statement should have been admitted because it was evidence of the
young woman’s state of mind just before her death.34 Following the reversal, Trefethen was acquitted at his second trial. Neither Anton Retkovitz
nor Celestino Medeiros was as fortunate. On retrial, both defendants (the
latter of who some said was responsible for the murders for which Sacco
and Vanzetti were executed) were convicted of murder in the first degree
and subsequently executed.35
The initial reversal won by Medeiros was one of only a baker’s dozen
of homicide cases reversed by the SJC from 1805 to 1939. During the
period 1940–1996, however, the number of homicide appeals and reversals
soared. For most of the SJC’s history, homicide appeals were a small part
31. Id. Women were permitted to serve as jurors in Massachusetts as of 1950. 1949 Mass. Acts ch.
347. The law allowed women an automatic exception if they had children at home or if they might be
embarrassed by testimony at trial, a provision that was eliminated in 1979. 1978 Mass. Acts. ch. 41;
see also Alan Rogers, “Finish the fight”: The Struggle for Women’s Jury Service in Massachusetts,
1920–1994, 2 MASS. HIST. REV. 27 (2000).
32. MASSACHUSETTS REPORTS vols. 157–301.
33. Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 182 (1892).
34. Id. at 183.
35. See Commonwealth v. Medeiros, 255 Mass. 304 (1926); Commonwealth v. Retkovitz, 222
Mass. 245 (1915); Herbert B. Ehrmann, Sacco and Vanzetti: The Magnetic Point and the Morelli
Evidence, 79 HARV. L. REV. 571, 581 (1966).
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of its work. From 1930 through 1960 the court’s homicide caseload remained about the same, rarely numbering more than two or three cases per
year. A sharp increase in the number of murders—from 1.0 per 100,000
Massachusetts residents in 1950 to 4.1 per 100,000 people in 1980—
together with the transformation in criminal justice initiated by the Warren
Court and sustained after 1969 by the SJC’s embrace of state constitutionalism caused the number of homicide appeals made to the SJC to bolt upward.36
From 1940 to 1996, the SJC heard 1033 homicide cases, nearly ten
times more than were before the court from 1892 to 1939, a roughly comparable time span. Of the total number, 729 were appeals made by defendants convicted of murder in the first degree; 229 were appealing a seconddegree murder conviction; and the court heard arguments from seventythree defendants convicted of manslaughter. The court found grounds for
reversal in 181 cases, or 17.5% of all homicide cases. One hundred
twenty-six first degree murder convictions were reversed; along with the
cases of thirty-two defendants convicted of second degree murder; twentythree manslaughter convictions; one case of not guilty by reason of insanity was reversed; and one murder case was sent to juvenile court. The percentage of all murder cases reversed was 16.4%. The percentage of homicide reversals—nearly four times greater than the period from 1892 to
1939—is striking evidence of the constitutional revolution that swept
through the courts generally after 1954, and specifically impacted the SJC
after 1970.37
A number of the homicide defendants who appealed to the SJC during
this period called upon the court to exercise its “extraordinary power” to
review questions of fact as well as law granted to it by a 1939 statute.38
The Judicial Council, an appointive advisory group formed in 1924, first
promoted this reform in 1927.39 In the tumultuous wake of the SaccoVanzetti case, the council called for legislation that would permit the SJC
to “pass upon the whole [capital] case,” and “to order a new trial upon any
36. U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 52 (1981) (reporting for the
year 1980); U.S. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 90 (1951) (reporting for
the year 1950). See, e.g., Baron, supra note 3 (discussing constitutional revolution sweeping courts in
this period).
37. Data compiled from Massachusetts Reports vols. 305–423.
38. See Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 407 (1944) (referring to the “extraordinary
power”).
39. “An Act Providing for the Establishment of a Judicial Council.” 1924 Mass. Acts. ch. 244. The
Judicial Council was composed of representatives, one each nominated by the chief justice of the SJC,
the chief justice of the superior court, the judge of the land court, one judge of a probate court, one
justice of a district court, and not more than four members of the bar appointed by the governor. The
appointments were not to exceed four years. See Third Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, MASS. L.Q., Nov. 1927, at 37.
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ground if the interests of justice appear to require it.”40 The council was
especially critical of a single trial judge’s power to pass on “mixed questions of law and fact arising on motions for a new trial.”41 Because such
decisions involve questions of life and death, “we think the responsibility
too great to be thrown upon one man,” the councilors argued.42 Even if the
trial judge is right, “there is no tribunal to establish the fact that he is
right.”43 “It is vital that our Courts do justice,” the council’s report concluded, “it is also vital that people know that they do justice.”44 A handful
of legislators took up the council’s recommendation. A great number of
lawyers, including prosecutors throughout the state, lobbied against the
bill. Allowing the SJC to review the facts of a capital case would be tantamount to holding a new trial and that would be unconstitutional. Although Governor Alvan T. Fuller weakly supported the reform, the Massachusetts House of Representatives easily defeated the bill.45
Twelve years later—when the passion aroused by Sacco-Vanzetti had
cooled somewhat—the legislature enacted the reform.46 The court was not
altogether pleased with its new power, however. In Commonwealth v. Gricus,47 and Commonwealth v. Bellino,48 Justices Henry T. Lummus and
Stanley E. Qua interpreted the 1939 law as narrowly as possible.49 While
the statute allows the court to consider the facts as well as the law, “[i]t
does not, however, convert this court into a second jury, which must be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of a defendant by reading
the reported evidence, without the advantage of seeing and hearing the
witnesses,” grumbled the court in Gricus.50 As Justice Lummus saw it, the
1939 law put the court in a position analogous to that of a trial judge dealing with a motion for a new trial. Like the trial judge, the SJC must determine that the verdict was “so greatly against the weight of the evidence as
to induce in his mind the strong belief that it was not due to careful consideration of the evidence, but that it was the product of bias, misapprehen40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Third Report, supra note 39, at 37–38.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CORNELIUS DALTON ET AL., LEADING THE WAY: A HISTORY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
GENERAL COURT 1629–1980, at 269–70 (Cornelius Dalton ed., 1984).
46. 1939 Mass. Acts 402–03.
47. 317 Mass. 403 (1944).
48. 320 Mass. 635 (1947).
49. Id. at 418; Gricus, 317 Mass. at 407. Lummus served as associate justice from 1932–1955.
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, http://www.massreports
.com/justices/alljustices.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2008). Qua was an associate justice from 1934–1956
and chief justice from 1947–1956. Id.
50. 317 Mass. at 406.
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sion or prejudice.”51 Only in such “rare instances” would the SJC grant a
new trial.52 In Bellino, the court made the eye of the needle through which
the defendant had to pass to win a new trial even smaller: the “statute . . .
does not require us to review all questions of evidence and of procedure at
the trial to which exceptions have not been duly saved.”53
The court’s clarity in regard to procedural rules did not extend to the
issue of determining the criminal responsibility of the insane. “[T]his
troublesome field,” as Justice Arthur Whittemore termed the court’s effort
to establish guidelines in criminal-insanity cases, was before the SJC in
1967.54 James McHoul, Jr., a patient at Boston State Hospital for the criminally insane, raped a female nurse. At trial, a psychiatrist testified for
the prosecution that, “according to the M’Naghten rule [McHoul] was legally sane;” he knew the difference between right and wrong.55 Defense
counsel objected and the trial judge struck out the part about the
M’Naghten rule, allowing the last part of the doctor’s statement to stand.
The defendant accepted.56 On appeal, the SJC reversed McHoul’s guilty
verdict, concluding that the judge’s ruling left the jury with an erroneous
opinion about McHoul’s sanity.57
The court might have stopped there, but it took a step toward acknowledging changes made by modern psychiatry and the idea that insanity was
not an “either or” proposition. It made the American Law Institute’s (ALI)
draft code on mental disease and criminal responsibility part of its decision, terming it an “evolutionary restatement” of Shaw’s 1844 ruling.58
There were key differences, however. The Rogers rule spoke of one who
has the “capacity . . . to distinguish between right and wrong, as to the particular act he is then doing; a knowledge and consciousness that the act he
is doing is wrong and criminal, and will subject him to punishment.”59 By
contrast, the ALI rule referred to the defendant’s “substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to con-

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 320 Mass. at 646.
54. Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 548 (1967).
55. Id. at 545.
56. Id. at 545–46.
57. Id. at 546, 555. M’Naughten pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to murdering Sir Robert
Peel’s secretary, mistaking him for Peel. Id. at 547. M’Naughten’s acquittal in 1843 led the English
House of Lords to pose a number of questions to the court. See M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep.
718, 722–23 (H.L.). The literature on the modern insanity defense is enormous. See, e.g., NORMAN J.
FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS’ NOTIONS OF THE LAW (1995) (arguing for inclusion of
ordinary citizens’ views of just and fair).
58. McHoul, 352 Mass. at 546–47.
59. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 501–02 (1844).
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form his conduct to the requirements of the law.”60 The McHoul rule also
rejected the concept of the “irresistible impulse” in favor of full expert
testimony about “all that was relevant to the defendant’s mental illness,”
and the “nature and extent of impairment” of the defendant’s mental faculties.61
The court’s hope that its new criteria for determining criminal responsibility would minimize misunderstanding proved ill founded. Of the
twenty-two murder-insanity appeals heard by the court from 1967
(McHoul) to 1996, twelve were reversed. Moreover, four of the twelve
reversals made significant changes in the procedural guidelines governing
criminal responsibility. In Gilday v. Commonwealth,62 the court upheld an
order from the trial court that the defendant disclose his intent to put forward an insanity defense. Six years later, in Blaisdell v. Commonwealth,63
the court tackled the problem of whether this rule violated the defendant’s
right against self-incrimination. Justice Liacos acknowledged that a court
ordered psychiatric exam abridged a defendant’s constitutional right
against self-incrimination, but he argued that the court could order a defendant to submit to an examination if the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination.64 In Commonwealth
v. Grey, the court seemed to take a controversial step down the slippery
slope of diminished capacity by ruling that although a defendant’s mental
impairment fell short of the McHoul test, the jury should consider his ability to form a specific intent on the day the homicide was committed.65
Finally, the court’s best efforts to bring reason and order to the issue of
criminal responsibility failed to satisfy public and political critics of Kenneth Seguin’s plea of not guilty by reason of insanity for the murder of his
wife and two children.66
The drive to reform capital procedure in cases where criminal responsibility or mental impairment was not in question led to a statute making it
possible for a jury to find a defendant guilty of first-degree murder, but not
to impose a sentence of death.67 Enacted in 1951, the law was the fruition
of a crusade to abolish capital punishment begun in 1927 by Sara Ehr60. McHoul, 352 Mass. at 546–47 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft
1962)).
61. Id. at 550, 553.
62. 360 Mass. 170 (1971).
63. 372 Mass. 753 (1977).
64. Id. at 754, 757, 764.
65. 399 Mass. 469, 471 (1987).
66. Commonwealth v. Seguin, 421 Mass. 243, 245 (1995). For newspaper columnists critical of the
insanity plea, see Howie Carr, State’s Victim of Decade Having a Whine Old Time, BOSTON HERALD,
Sept. 13, 1995, at 8; Bella English, Shameless for the Defense, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 18, 1993, at 17;
Bella English, True Insanity—and False, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 30, 1994, at 19.
67. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 2 (1951).
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mann, executive secretary of the Massachusetts Council Against the Death
Penalty.68 From 1951 to 1972, the year the U.S. Supreme Court held unconstitutional capital punishment as then practiced, Massachusetts jurors
recommended life imprisonment for 100 out of 132 convicted murderers.69
Chief Justice Raymond Wilkins led the SJC during most of this period.
He was determined to steer the court in a familiar conservative direction,
contrary to the course set by U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren. In 1958, Wilkins joined with nine other state supreme court chief justices to publicly decry the Supreme Court for “adopting the role of policy
maker and failing to exercise proper judicial restraint.”70 The conference
of state court chief justices also bemoaned the Supreme Court’s alleged
abandonment of stare decisis and its “unwillingness to wait for Congress to
make clear its intention to exercise the powers conferred upon it under the
Constitution.”71
The Wilkins court, however tough its talk, reversed eighteen of ninetythree homicide cases, more than twice as many cases as had been reversed
in the previous decade. It would be a mistake to attribute this increase
solely to changes in criminal procedure imposed on state court criminal
procedure by the Warren Court. Two other factors were more significant:
the Wilkins court heard a greater number of appeals simply because the
Massachusetts murder rate jumped from 1.0 per 100,000 inhabitants in
1950 to 3.5 in 1970, the year Wilkins retired; and, in 1962, the legislature
expanded the court’s power to review capital cases by allowing it to consider the appellant’s degree of guilt.72 Under the new law, the court could
reduce a convicted murderer’s degree of guilt if it believed there had been
68. Id. The law required jurors to agree unanimously on the punishment. 1951 Mass. Acts 203.
The vote in the Massachusetts Senate was twenty to nineteen. JORNAL OF THE MASSACHUSETTES
SENATE 608–12, 647–48 (1951). For information on Sarah Ehrmann, see Biography of Ehrmann, in
SARA EHRMANN PAPERS 33 (on file with Northeastern University).
69. Opinion of the Justices, 372 Mass. 912, 919 (1977). From 1963 to 1975 Suffolk County juries
recommended the death penalty not be imposed in thirty-nine of fifty-five first-degree murder trials.
Commonwealth v. O’Neal (O’Neal II), 369 Mass. 242, 261 n.19 (1975). Additionally, between 1947
and 1973, forty-three original death sentences were commuted or reduced by executive action. District
Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 662 (1980). On appeal, the SJC heard fifty-nine
capital cases between 1951 and 1973, it reversed five in which the jury had sentenced the defendant to
death and four in which the jury had not recommended the death penalty. See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS
REPORTS vols. 328–408; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (stating that the death sentences of twenty-four Massachusetts men were commuted to life imprisonment).
70. Raymond Sanger Wilkins, “Memorial,” 361 Mass. 912, 914 (1972). The report of the Committee on Federal-State Relations, of which Wilkins was a member, was entitled The Constitutional Principle of Judicial Self-Control—A Challenge to Balanced Professional Thinking, MASS. L.Q., Oct. 1958,
at 77.
71. The Conference of Chief Justices adopted a milder version of the committee’s report by a vote
of thirty-six to eight. See The Constitutional Principle of Judicial Self-Control—A Challenge to Balanced Professional Thinking, supra note 70, at 88, 89.
72. 1962 Mass. Acts ch. 260.
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a miscarriage of justice in convicting the defendant of the greater charge.73
This legislative provision accounted for four of the eighteen cases reversed
by the Wilkins court. Only three cases were reversed to bring the court
into conformity with the Supreme Court’s rulings affecting a homicide
suspect’s constitutional rights.74 Whatever ambivalence the SJC may have
harbored about the Warren Court was put aside in favor of the rule of law
and deference to the high court. In McKenna, for example, the SJC found
that Boston police had not adhered to Miranda guidelines and, therefore,
the first-degree murder convictions of McKenna and his partner were set
aside.75
We end this opinion with the observation that the speed and skill
shown by the police in gathering evidence of a direct or circumstantial nature merit commendation. Where the evidence relied
upon, however, consists of self-incriminating statements made by
the accused while in custody under interrogation by the police, the
procedures prescribed by the Miranda case must be observed in
order that the statements be admissible. Those procedures have
been developed, formulated, and promulgated by the Supreme
Court of the United States and have been given constitutional
standing by that court. They are part of the law of the land and
must be obeyed.76
To some observers, it seemed as if G. Joseph Tauro, who was appointed chief justice of the SJC in 1970 by Republican Governor Francis
Sargent, was as out of step with the constitutional revolution as Justice
Wilkins earlier had professed to be. The Boston Globe denounced Tauro
personally and professionally. Tauro’s “most distinguished feature in the
legal world,” the Globe charged, “has been his pompous, self-important
manner. He is also known for his vindictive attitude toward his critics.”77
To drive home the point, the Globe added: “The state’s high court needs
new blood, new talent, new thinking, new force. The Tauro appointment
73. Id. According to the amendment, if the court found that the verdict was against the weight of
the evidence, or for any other reason justice may require, it could order a new trial, or direct the entry
of a lesser degree of guilt and remand the case to the superior court for sentencing. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McCauley, 355 Mass. 554 (1969); Commonwealth v. White, 353 Mass. 409 (1967);
Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 351 Mass. 203 (1966); Commonwealth v. Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 109
(1963).
74. The three cases reversed on constitutional error were Commonwealth v. Carita, 356 Mass. 132
(1969), Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313 (1969), and Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 348
Mass. 7 (1964).
75. McKenna, 355 Mass. at 327.
76. Id.
77. Tom Long, G. Joseph Tauro Was Chief Justice of SJC and Superior Court, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 7, 1994, at 88.
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brings none of this.”78 Born and educated in Lynn, Massachusetts, the son
of an immigrant shoemaker and his wife, Tauro attended Boston University Law School. Admitted to the bar in 1927, he returned home and
slowly built a prosperous private practice. One of his clients was Volpe
Construction, a relationship that eventually led him to Beacon Hill as
newly elected Governor John A. Volpe’s legal counsel in 1961. Two years
later, Tauro was appointed chief justice of the superior court, a position he
held until he was elevated to the SJC.79
Almost immediately after assuming his seat on the court, Chief Justice
Tauro made it clear how wrong his critics were about his commitment to
change. In a heated dissent, he blistered the SJC’s ancient policy of legislative deference: “I do not believe that we should look to the Legislature
for change,” he wrote, “[t]o do so is a distortion of the concept of judicial
review.”80 A year later, Tauro assaulted the court’s “slavish adherence to
stare decisis.”81 In criminal procedure, too, the court swept aside old rules
and added new protections for the accused. From 1970 to 1996 the SJC
reversed 157 (16.3%) of the 958 homicide cases it heard, including ten
homicide cases whose determination rested on the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.82
With encouragement from Justice William Brennan, among others,
Tauro and his successors, Edward Hennessey and Paul Liacos thrust the
SJC into the forefront of the movement to supplement federal constitutional rights with state constitutional guarantees.83 Chief Justice Hennessey publicly encouraged lawyers to make greater use of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights to protect the accused, and in 1980 his colleague
Justice Herbert Wilkins exulted: “[T]he Supreme Judicial Court currently
appears more outspoken concerning the significance of rights under the

78. Id.
79. Honorable G. Joseph Tauro, 61 MASS. L.Q. 19 (1976).
80. Lombardo v. D. F. Frangioso & Co., 359 Mass. 529, 536 (1971).
81. United Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Jay’s Stores, Inc., 278 N.E.2d 716, 727 (Mass. 1972).
82. See Commonwealth v. Lydon, 413 Mass. 309 (1992); Commonwealth v. Harris, 409 Mass. 461
(1991); Commonwealth v. Kater, 409 Mass. 433 (1991); Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass.
150 (1984); Commonwealth v. Hodge, 386 Mass. 165 (1982); District Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v.
Watson, 381 Mass. 648 (1980); Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283 (1979); Commonwealth v.
Soares, 377 Mass. 461 (1979); Commonwealth v. O’Neal (O’Neal II), 369 Mass. 242 (1975); Commonwealth v. O’Neal (O’Neal I), 367 Mass. 440 (1975).
83. For Justice Brennan’s remarks lauding the trend toward state activism, see his dissent in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), in which Brennan pointed out that “[e]ach State has power to impose higher standards governing police practices under state law than is required by the Federal Constitution.” Id. at 120; see also William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). Edward Hennessey was chief justice from 1976 to 1989
and Paul Liacos was chief justice from 1989 to 1996.
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Declaration of Rights than at any other time in its history.”84 The SJC often imposed higher state constitutional standards than required by the Supreme Court. Indeed, the SJC’s aggressive use of the state’s constitution
opened the door to the abolition of capital punishment in Massachusetts.85
In O’Neal I, the SJC concluded that the mandatory death penalty for
murder committed in the course of rape violated the fundamental right to
life protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Tauro held that
“life is a constitutionally protected fundamental right, the infringement
upon which triggers strict scrutiny under the compelling state interest and
least restrictive means test.”86 Therefore, for the state to take a life it must
show its action “is the least restrictive means toward furtherance of a compelling governmental end.”87 Tauro brushed aside the Commonwealth’s
arguments justifying the mandatory death penalty for rape-murder. Specifically, the state had not met its heavy burden of showing that “in pursuing its legitimate objectives, it has chosen means which do not unnecessarily impinge on the fundamental constitutional right to life.”88 However,
because the Commonwealth had not addressed the issue of whether the
death penalty was the least restrictive means toward fulfilling a compelling
state interest, Tauro ordered additional arguments be presented in June
1975.89
Justices Edward Hennessey, Herbert Wilkins, and Benjamin Kaplan
concurred with Tauro’s conclusion, but the three contended that a constitutional analysis of the death penalty had to take into account the prohibition
against cruel or unusual punishment in Article 26 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights.90 Wilkins distinguished Article 26 from the Eighth
Amendment. He conceded that at the time of its adoption Article 26 was
not intended to abolish capital punishment, but he asserted that its contemporary meaning was shaped by “the evolving standards of decency that

84. Herbert P. Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in Relation to
Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 887, 890–91 (1980).
Herbert is a son of past Chief Justice Raymond Wilkins.
85. See Alan Rogers, An Anchor to the Windward: The Right of the Accused to an Impartial Jury in
Massachusetts Capital Cases, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 35 (1999) (citing state constitution court restricted discriminatory use of peremptory challenges).
86. O’Neal I, 327 N.E.2d at 668.
87. Id. Tauro noted that his analysis rested on the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, but
“that fundamental constitutional principles enshrined in our State Constitution dictate an identical
result.” Id. at 668 n.5.
88. Commonwealth v. O’Neal (O’Neal II), 339 N.E.2d 676, 688 (Mass. 1975).
89. O’Neal I, 367 Mass. at 450.
90. Id. at 451 (Wilkins, J., concurring).
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mark the progress of a maturing society.”91 For that reason, Article 26 set
higher standards than the Eighth Amendment.92
Three days before Christmas, a bitterly divided court announced its decision in O’Neal II.93 The five to two ruling held the mandatory death sentence for rape-murder violated the Massachusetts constitutional guarantee
of due process and the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.94
The decision left the state with no capital punishment for murder, because
in Furman v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down capital punishment under the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth
Amendment.95 O’Neal’s case was remanded to the superior court where he
was re-sentenced to life imprisonment. The chief justice pointed out that
the SJC’s interpretation of the state constitution is final and cannot be challenged in the federal courts.96 In concurring opinions, Justices Wilkins and
Kaplan questioned whether any death penalty statute could be enacted that
would not violate the Declarations of Rights prohibition against cruel or
unusual punishment.97
A state budget crisis and an increasingly loud clamor for reinstating the
death penalty in Massachusetts following the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia98 led to Governor Michael
Dukakis’s defeat in 1978 by his conservative Democrat rival Edward J.
King. The legislature quickly passed a death penalty law that King signed
in the winter of 1980.99 District Attorney of Suffolk County Newman Flanagan immediately forced a test of its constitutionality.100 The court concluded the law was contrary to Article 26. Its rejection of the district attorney’s complaint was based on two grounds: “[T]he death penalty [was]
unacceptably cruel under contemporary standards of decency;” and “the
death penalty [was] administered with unconstitutional arbitrariness and
discrimination.”101

91. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
92. Id.
93. 369 Mass. 242 (1975).
94. Id. at 263–64. In O’Neal II, Tauro abandoned his least restrictive means test argument. He
sharply attacked Justices Braucher and Reardon. Id. at 263–73. Richard F. McCarthy, co-editor of the
Massachusetts Law Quarterly, noted Tauro’s “very pointed and acerbic rebuttal” and wondered, “if the
limits of judicial restraint were not overstepped by the Chief Justice.” Constitutional Law—Mandatory
Death Penalty, 61 MASS. L.Q. 46, 47 (1976).
95. 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972).
96. O’Neal II, 369 Mass. at 267.
97. Id. at 276, 278.
98. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
99. 1979 Mass. Acts 502–03.
100. District Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648 (1980).
101. Id. at 649.
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In 1984, the SJC was confronted once again with a capital punishment
statute and once again found it unconstitutional.102 This time the court
could not rely upon Article 26. On November 2, 1982, Massachusetts voters had rejected the court’s Article 26 argument by adding the following
language:
No provision of the Constitution, however, shall be construed as
prohibiting the imposition of the punishment of death. The general
court may, for the purpose of protecting the general welfare of the
citizens, authorize the imposition of the punishment of death by
the courts of law having jurisdiction of crimes subject to the punishment of death.103
This constitutional amendment was adopted by the legislature and
lame-duck Governor Edward King signed a new death penalty statute into
law.104 Two months after the law took effect, three assailants shot thirtysix year-old state trooper George Hanna to death in the parking lot of J&S
Liquors on Route 20 in Auburn. At pretrial hearings, the Commonwealth
asked that the constitutionality of the death penalty statute be ruled upon
before the case came to trial.105
Speaking for a slim four to three majority, Justice Liacos acknowledged that the amendment “now prevents this court from construing any
provision of the Massachusetts Constitution, including art. 26 itself, as
forbidding the imposition of the punishment of death.”106 But Liacos
quickly added: “We do not, however, see anything in the new language of
art. 26 which prevents us from invalidating a particular death penalty statute under the Massachusetts Constitution on a ground other than that the
imposition of the punishment of death is forbidden.”107 In fact, the court
found the 1982 death penalty statute violated Article 12 of the Declaration
of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution, because it provided that only
those defendants who pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial were at
risk of being put to death.108 Those who pleaded guilty avoided the death
penalty. “The inevitable consequence,” wrote Justice Liacos, “is that de-

102. See Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150 (1984) (holding that the death penalty statute
impermissibly burdens state constitutional rights against self-incrimination and jury trial).
103. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 26; amend. art. 116.
104. 1982 Mass. Acts. ch. 554, § 8.
105. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. at 152–53.
106. Id. at 158.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 163.
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fendants are discouraged from asserting their right not to plead guilty and
their right to demand a trial by jury.”109
For more than two centuries the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
reviewed and occasionally reversed murder convictions, because it was
committed to the ideal that it was the court’s duty to permit a person “to
quibble for his life.”110 Two hundred years after its constitutional establishment, the court concluded that however carefully tailored, capital jurisprudence could not guarantee justice. Measured by the Declaration of
Rights the death penalty was not constitutionally tolerable. The death penalty is impermissibly cruel and repugnant to contemporary standards of
decency.

109. Id. Liacos cited Letters v. Commonwealth, 346 Mass. 403 (1963), in which the court found trial
judge Paul Reardon—who now sat on the SJC—had unconstitutionally coerced two defendants into
pleading guilty. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. at 168. Chief Justice Hennessey cited United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), in which the Supreme Court had found unconstitutional a similar statute.
Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. at 173 (Hennessey, C.J., concurring).
110. THEOPHILUS PARSONS, MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS PARSONS, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURT 258 (Boston, Ticknor & Fields 1861).

